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Protecting Scientific Integrity: The
Commercial Speech Doctrine Applied
to Industry Publications
Joanna K. Sax, J.D., Ph.D.†

I. INTRODUCTION
The pharmaceutical industry is a competitive business. Companies spend
billions of dollars researching and developing new drugs. 1 Many drugs never
make it to market. For the limited drugs that make it through the
experimental, regulatory, and clinical rigors of drug development, companies
recoup their lost expenditures for the drugs that previously failed.
Pharmaceutical companies face increasing pressure to bring new
treatments to market in order to survive. The economic reality of survival and
profits may distort a company’s decision-making process regarding full
disclosure on a particular new drug. An example of this type of conflict was
seen in the silicone breast implant fiasco in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s. Dow
Corning, the manufacturer of the implants, withheld important data from
long-term animal models that demonstrated adverse effects from the breast
implants.2 Further, Dow failed to conduct long-term studies on breast
implants, even when armed with data indicating that such studies were
necessary to ensure the continued health of the patients. 3 Presumably, Dow
stood to lose large sums of money if it conducted the long-term studies
because it might establish the implants were harmful. It took litigation to
expose Dow’s failure to conduct the proper studies of the long-term effects of
its implants.
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1
Frank Vinluan, Pharma Spending on R&D Nosedived in 2009, Study Finds, Triangle
Bus.
J.
(May
31,
2010),
http://www.bizjournals.com/triangle/stories/2010/05/31/story12.html
(“R&D
spending
among U.S. pharma companies last year declined by thirteen percent, to $17.2 billion from
$19.8 billion in 2008.”).
2
Hopkins v. Dow Corning Corp., 33 F.3d 1116, 1119 (9th Cir. 1994).
3
Id.
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Pharmaceutical companies are experts in marketing their new drugs. To
do this in the medical and scientific literature, companies will publish posit ive
results of their clinical trials. 4 They tend not, however, to disclose negative
results of clinical trials in scientific publications, or they down-play the
negative results. Further, pharmaceutical companies may suppress negative
results, change design studies, or halt studies early if they think the results
may not be positive. 5 No regulation requires that industry publish negative
results, and the scientific community, the public, and policymakers may never
be aware of such negative results. 6
Pharmaceutical companies expend enormous resources promoting new
drugs. In addition to direct-to-consumer advertisements, they publish results
in non-peer reviewed scientific/medical journals, host symposiums, and write
multiple articles citing their own work. They use these tactics to flood the
medical and scientific literature with positive information about their drug.
This might not be so harmful if it were not often intertwined with strategies of
suppressing negative results in clinical trials. That is, some of the publications
are misleading because they only tell half the story—but the other half, i.e., the
negative consequences from the drug, is not reported. This selective reporting
causes harm because doctors may be misled into using an inferior or harmful
treatment.
Part II of this article analyzes the publication tactics employed by some
members of the pharmaceutical industry (hereinafter “industry”) and explains
how some of the publications promote misleading information. In recent
years, an entire sector has arisen to assist in the publication and promotion of
pharmaceutical drugs. This section also introduces the Lanham Act, which
prohibits false advertising. Claims against some industry tactics may be
brought under the Lanham Act.
It is unclear, however, whether the Lanham Act can adequately address
the issues with biased or misleading industry publications. For this reason,
Part III proposes policy recommendations to require accurate dissemination
4
See, e.g., Mark Friedberg et al., Evaluation of Conflict of Interest in Economic Analyses
of New Drugs Used in Oncology, 282 JAMA 1453, 1453 (1999) (“Similarly, a study of clinical
trial publications determined that there was a significant association between positive results
in general internal medicine clinical trials and funding from a pharmaceutical manufacturer.”)
Of note, the Friedberg study was funded by an unrestricted grant from Amgen, Inc., which had
a contractual right to review and comment on the manuscript and abstract prior to
publication. See also Sameer S. Chopra, Industry Funding of Clinical Trials: Benefit or Bias?,
290 JAMA 113, 113 (2003) (“Research supported by pharmaceutical companies may also be
subject to methodological bias. Industry funded clinical trials and cost-effectiveness analyses,
for instance, yield positive results far more often than studies that are funded or conducted by
other entities.”).
5
See Chopra, supra note 4, at 113 (“Numerous industry-sponsored trials, for example, are
prematurely terminated for financial rather than for scientific or ethical reasons.”).
6
In 2007, Congress expanded the use of a trial registry data bank that requires the
registration of clinical trials for life-threatening conditions. Food and Drug Administration
Amendments Act, Pub. L. No. 110-85, § 801, 121 Stat. 823, 904-22 (2007) [hereinafter
FDAAA] (amending 42 U.S.C. § 282). This is a limited regulation that does not encompass all
the past and ongoing studies conducted by the pharmaceutical companies. See also
Clinicaltrails.gov
Fact
Sheet,
Nat’l
Insts.
of
Health,
http://www.nlm.nih.gov/pubs/factsheets/clintrial.html (last updated Sept. 15, 2009) (The
legislation requires the Department of Health and Human Services, through the NIH, to
establish a registry of clinical trials for both federally and privately funded trials “of
experimental treatments for serious or life-threatening diseases or conditions.”).
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of the results of clinical trials in order to protect scientific integrity and the
public welfare. As previously called for by me and others, a national registry of
all clinical trials would provide, in part, the needed transparency. The reader
of any publication reporting the results of a clinical study could cross-check
the accuracy of the data with a national registry. Another recommendation is
to enact a regulation called the Truth in Marketing (TIM) Act. The TIM Act’s
policy objectives would expand the Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA)
current regulatory authority to penalize pharmaceutical companies for false or
misleading direct-to-consumer advertising by including regulation of
indirect-to-consumer marketing, such as publications in scientific journals. In
addition, the TIM Act would provide for a private cause of action so that
individuals and groups can bring claims against pharmaceutical companies
for false or misleading publications found in scientific journals. The private
cause of action would be limited to claims against a party that has a profitseeking motive, thus traditional academic hypotheses would not be impacted
by this regulation. In essence, the TIM Act is a combination and extrapolation
of the Lanham Act and other FDA programs, but the focus is on indirect-toconsumer marketing by the pharmaceutical industry.
An obvious defense on the part of industry to anything resembling the
TIM Act is that their speech is fully protected by the First Amendment. Part
IV of this article addresses whether industry publications are fully protected
scientific speech or less fully protected commercial speech, and it concludes
that the industry publications fall within the latter category. This section also
analyzes whether the publications are misleading, which ends the inquiry
there, or whether it is necessary to enact regulations that appropriately
protect the public interest in sound science. This part concludes that no
current federal regulation addresses these misleading or biasing industry
tactics in a sufficient manner, and again stresses the need for a regulation
such as the TIM Act.
II. MISLEADING INDUSTRY PUBLICATIONS
The pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies publish components of
their research in a variety of medical and scientific journals in order to
promote their companies’ product(s). Previous studies demonstrate that
industry publications have a bias in that they tend to report positive results of
clinical trials. 7 This is not surprising because industry has a profit-seeking
motive and companies are likely to closely monitor the progress and process of
a research study in such a way that adverse results may be suppressed leading
to the publication of biased results. 8
This bias does not exist—or at least not to the same extreme—in
publications by academic laboratories that receive public funding. This is
most likely due, in part, to the culture of academic science and the process of
7
Friedberg et al., supra note 4, at 1455 (“Studies funded by pharmaceutical companies
were nearly 8 times less likely to reach unfavorable qualitative conclusions than nonprofit funded studies and 1.4 times more likely to reach favorable qualitative conclusions.”).
8
Wendy Wagner & David Michaels, Equal Treatment for Regulatory Science: Extending
the Controls Governing the Quality of Public Research to Private Research , 30 Am. J.L. & Med.
119, 120 (2004).
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peer review. Academic scientists publish results of their studies to
communicate with other scientists in an attempt to collaboratively advance
science. While most academic scientists publish positive results of
experiments, a lot can be learned from results that are negative or not
statistically significant. It is similar to the old adage—don’t reinvent the
wheel. Once a study has failed, there is value in communicating the results so
that another laboratory does not waste time or resources only to find a dead
end. It must be noted that even in the academic realm, there is a dearth of
publications of negative results.
A. Publishing Tactics
This article focuses on industry’s ability to manipulate scientists,
physicians and ultimately the public through the publication of misleading
studies. Some members of industry employ tactics to promote their studies,
such as paying companies to find placements, hosting their own symposiums,
publishing the same results in multiple journals, using ghost-authors and
publishing results by paying to be placed in corporate-sponsored
publications.9 Furthermore, there is a significant association between the
reporting of positive results in a clinical trial of a new drug or treatment and
funding from a pharmaceutical manufacturer. 10 For example, Mark Friedberg
and colleagues conducted a study to determine whether “pharmaceutical
company-funded economic studies are more likely than nonprofit-funded
studies to report favorable qualitative assessments and less likely to report
unfavorable qualitative assessments.” 11 This study concluded that “[s]tudies
funded by pharmaceutical companies were nearly 8 times less likely to reach
unfavorable qualitative conclusions than nonprofit-funded studies and 1.4
times more likely to reach favorable qualitative conclusions.” 12 The study also
9
Id. at 125 (“Some sponsors, for example, have been caught publishing the same study in
different journals under different author names with no cross-references, making it appear
that the research support in favor of their product or activity is based on severa l independent
studies, rather than simply a re-reporting of the same findings”); see Sergio Sismondo, Ghost
Management: How Much of the Medical Literature is Shaped Behind the Scenes by the
Pharmaceutical Industry?, 4 PLoS Med. 1429, 1429 (2007) (“In extreme cases, drug
companies pay for trials by contract research organizations (CROs), analyze the data in -house,
have professionals write manuscripts, ask academics to serve as authors of those manuscripts,
and pay communication companies to shepherd them through publication in the best journals.
The resulting articles affect conclusions found in the medical literature, and are use d in
promoting drugs to doctors”); see also Richard Smith, Conflicts of Interest: How Money Clouds
Objectivity, 99 J. Royal Soc’y Med. 292, 293 (2006) (“In fact, the only factor associated with
the review’s conclusion was whether the author was affiliated with the tobacco industry.
Three-quarters of the articles concluding that passive smoking was not harmful were written
by tobacco industry affiliates” (citation omitted)).
10
See Friedberg et al., supra note 4, at 1453; Smith, supra note 9, at 293 (“The JAMA
review found 11 studies that compared the outcome of studies sponsored by industry and those
not so sponsored. In every study those that were sponsored were more likely to have a finding
favourable to industry” (internal citation omitted)); see also Sismondo, supra note 9, at 1429.
11
See Friedberg et al., supra note 4, at 1453.
12
See id. at 1455. A number of reasons may account for this. For example, the
pharmaceutical company may be more likely to conduct clinical trials based on highly positive
initial studies. Another reason, however, could be that pharmaceutical companies may want to
control what is published and simply decide not to publish negative results. These, and other
reasons, are suggested in the study conducted by Friedberg and colleagues.
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found that the qualitative statements were actually overstatements of
quantitative results. 13
An entire industry is dedicated to helping pharmaceutical and
biotechnology companies place their publications in journals, which can have
a considerable influence on medical research. 14 For example, one company
named Current Medical Directions (CMD) assists pharmaceutical companies
with the publication of articles. 15 Although the full range of services offered by
companies such as CMD is unclear, it appears that CMD may help
pharmaceutical companies place articles in higher-ranked journals, find
academics to ghost-author articles, and assist in garnering citations to the
particular article. 16 All of these tactics increase exposure to the results of the
particular study.
The use of these types of commercial tactics to publish articles is
antithetical to the academic and scientific process of publication, which uses a
peer review system to advance paradigms or argue for paradigm shifts.
Scientific integrity is protected, in part, by the review of submitted research
articles by scientific peers. The scientists review articles to determine whether
the conclusions are valid based on the experiments, whether the proposed
articles advance scientific understanding, and whether additional experiments
are needed to prove the authors’ conclusions. Instead of subjecting themselves
to peer review, some members of industry will skirt around this system by
creating their own publications, such as symposium issues, which allows them
to promote their products without having the academic and scientific
community review the research prior to publication. Even if a company
submits its findings to a peer reviewed journal, studies show that privatelyfunded clinical trials report a bias in favor of their results, such that even the
peer reviewers may not know if other data exists to temper the statements
regarding the positive results. In these ways, industry can flood the scientific
press with articles about their products.
A problem arises when the industry publications mislead the readers as to
the conclusions in the paper. 17 To illustrate this problem, the following
hypothetical will be referred to throughout this article:

13

See id.
Sismondo, supra note 9, at 1429; see also MaryAnn Foote & Philip David Noguchi,
Posting of Clinical Trials and Clinical Trial Results: Information for Medical Writers, 20 Am.
Med. Writers Ass’n 47, 47 (2005) (informing medical writers who work for drug sponsors of
the new rules regarding the reporting of clinical trials).
15
Sismondo, supra note 9, at 1430; see also Our Work, Current Medical Directions,
http://www.cmdny.com/work.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2011).
16
Sismondo, supra note 9, at 1430 (“[T]he CMD articles were published in more
prominent journals, had nearly twice as many authors per article, and garnered nearly three
times as many citations.”).
17
Cf. Wagner & Michaels, supra note 8, at 122 (“At the same time that privately
sponsored research provides a critical input to regulation, there is growing evidence that it can
be compromised in ways that might underreport or even suppress evidence of harm. Sponsors
face strong incentives to design and report research in ways most favorable to their interests
and to suppress adverse results provided they can do so without detection.”).
14
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Working Hypothetical: A company has an experimental medicine
to treat high cholesterol. In a clinical trial, the company learns
that its drug shows better results than the current standard
therapy after six months of treatment. The company, however,
also learns from this clinical study that after twelve months of
treatment, there is no difference between the company’s new
drug and treatment with standard therapy. 18 Since the twelvemonth results are not helpful to the company to promote the
product, the company may decide to suppress the twelve-month
time point and only publish the results of the first six months of
the study.19 Here, the company publishes the article in a non-peer
reviewed journal. The company then writes several other articles
citing its original article. Further, the company publishes a review
article of drugs on the market for treatment of high cholesterol
and highlights its own drug. The company then sends the review
article to policymakers in Washington, D.C. to be used to support
policies concerning the public health. In addition, the company
promotes its product by sending reprints of its article to
clinicians—in an effort to tell them that the company’s new
product is better than the standard treatment that these
clinicians are currently prescribing to their patients.
All of these activities promote misleading or biased information because the
company knows that there is no difference after one year between their new
drug and the standard therapy. But by failing to include this information, the
public, politicians, and clinicians may have no idea. Put differently, the
publication may be accurate or truthful with respect to the data gathered at
the six-month time-point, but the publication gives a false impression, via
omission, that no other data was collected or that no other data exists to
provide support for a contrary conclusion. 20 Plus, the public, politicians,
scientists, and clinicians have almost no way to confirm or deny the data.
The hypothetical described above is reminiscent of the breast implant
fiasco in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s. Although not a perfect analogy, the Dow
case highlights the problem when a private company suppresses information
18
The FDA may approve this drug to treat high cholesterol if the results demonstrate that
the new drug is safe and effective. This is so, even if, for example, the new drug does not offer
benefits beyond the standard treatment.
19
Cf. Wagner & Michaels, supra note 8, at 126 (“Finally and perhaps most serious is the
ability of sponsors to suppress research when the results are adverse to their interests. Unlike
fraud, suppressing adverse results can sometimes be done with discretionary judgments that
are not illegal. For example, sponsors can abort research before it is completed, and base this
decision on limited resources or some purported design flaw in the study. For research that is
completed, sponsors can still justify withholding the results based on discretionar y judgments
that the research design or reporting was incomplete or flawed in some way or that follow -up
research is needed to confirm or validate the findings.” (citations omitted)).
20
See Catherine DeAngelis, The Influence of Money on Medical Science, 296 JAMA 996,
996 (2006) (“There have been a number of high-profile examples of such research
irregularities involving for-profit companies, such as . . . reporting only 6 months of data in a
trial designed to have 12 months of data as the primary outcome . . . .”); Chopra, supra note 4,
at 114 (“Bias may also occur in the reporting of industry-funded clinical trials. Withholding the
publication of unfavorable results, for example, is not uncommon although the practice is
considered scientific misconduct.”).
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or fails to follow-up on preliminary data. At issue in Hopkins v. Dow Corning
Corp. was whether Dow was liable for a variety of health problems associated
with its silicone gel breast implants.21 Dow denied liability, but the evidence
demonstrated that Dow had knowledge of the harmful effects of the breast
implants and that it suppressed these findings. 22 Dow previously conducted
animal model studies and learned that after six months the implants were
fine, but that after two years the animals experienced an immune reaction
around the implants. 23 Dow did not publish these results for years, and when
they did finally release the results they omitted the negative findings, which
had the consequence of misleading the public to believe that the implants
were safe. 24 On top of this, the animal models and other studies should have
made it clear to Dow that it needed to conduct long-term studies, but Dow did
not.25 Presumably, Dow did not want to learn the results of long-term clinical
studies because they might show that the breast implants were harmful. Both
the failure to report the animal studies, and the failure to conduct additional
studies misled the public into believing that Dow’s breast implants were safe,
though they were not.
The working hypothetical above addresses the publication of misleading
information. Previous work analyzes the failure of the pharmaceutical
industry to publish negative results of clinical trials. 26 This previous work
described that pharmaceutical companies failed to report or failed to study
anecdotal reports of the treatment of children with antidepressant drugs
leading to suicidal behaviors in teenagers. Congress held hearings to address
industry’s failure to conduct appropriate clinical studies in teenage
populations.27 The failure by some members of industry to publish negative
results from clinical trials or to follow-up on anecdotal information led, in
part, to hiding the negative effects of anti-depressants in children.28 In short,
the omission or hiding of negative data misled the medical world, which
impacted the public. If this story seems similar to the breast implant case, that
is because it is.
A variety of problems stem from the failure to report negative results, or
only to report positive results, even when the company is aware of negative
results.29 The first problem is the potentially widespread dissemination of
these results. This may attract the popular press, which may pick up on an
industry publication with misleading results and report it to a wide audience.
Using the working hypothetical posed above, a New York Times reporter may
write a story reporting that studies with a new cholesterol drug demonstrate
better results than the standard treatment. A media storm may influence
patients to request the new drug. Physicians may end up prescribing this new
21

Hopkins v. Dow Corning Corp., 33 F.3d 1116, 1118 (9th Cir. 1994).
Id. at 1119.
23
Id.
24
Id.
25
Id. at 1127.
26
Joanna K. Sax, Reforming FDA Policy for Pediatric Testing: Challenges and Changes in
the Wake of Studies Using Antidepressant Drugs, 4 Ind. Health L. Rev. 61, 71-75 (2007).
27
Id. at 75.
28
Id. at 75.
29
Cf. DeAngelis, supra note 20, at 996 (“In some instances, the marketing goal of a
company dominates the scientific aspect of the company-funded research.”).
22
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drug. And all of this occurred because the company published the partial
results of a clinical trial in a non-peer reviewed journal.
Second, reporting studies with misleading information, despite evidence
to the contrary, may lead scientists on a dead-end chase.30 Using our working
hypothetical, we could assume that the company’s new drug uses a different
biochemical pathway than the standard treatment. A scientist may see the
multiple reports and review article promoted by the company including the
data that the new drug provides more effective treatment than standard
therapy. It turns out that the new drug uses a different biochemical pathway
than the standard treatment. The scientist may begin conducting experiments
to analyze the drug’s biochemical properties in this new pathway. The
problem is, however, that the new drug is not better than standard treatment
after one year, and through the misleading publication, the company is, in
effect, stonewalling scientific progress. Time, energy, and money may be
wasted.
The third problem is the potential for the misleading publications to
influence policy decisions. If the company promotes its misleading study by
communicating it to policymakers, then the policymakers might rely on
flawed, biased, or even untrue information. That is, policymakers would be
using inappropriate information to create policy. 31 Finally, misleading
industry publications stifle scientific progress and chip away at the public’s
trust in scientists. 32 In sum, misleading industry publications threaten
scientific integrity.
The tobacco industry’s use of propaganda in the 1960s and 1970s is an
example of the parade of evils described above. During those two decades, the
tobacco industry refuted evidence of harmful effects of second-hand smoke. 33
The tobacco industry flooded the scientific literature with studies that
concluded that passive smoking was not harmful. 34 The tobacco industry did
this by publishing articles in non-peer reviewed journals, publishing their own
articles, and writing letters to the editor in medical journals.35 The majority of
articles that concluded that passive smoking was not harmful were written by

30
Cf. Heidi Ledford, Diabetes Drugs Offered Fresh Start, 466 Nature 420, 420 (2010)
(“Since Avandia (rosiglitazone) hit the market, he [Steven Nissen] said, developers have
wasted their time on at least 50 other drugs that act by a similar mechanism. All of them
failed, Nissen said, some because they posed similar risks to the heart.”).
31
Wagner & Michaels, supra note 8, at 121.
32
See also Catherine D. DeAngelis, Phil B. Fontanarosa, & Annette Flanagin, Reporting
Financial Conflicts of Interest and Relationships Between Investigators and Research
Sponsors, 286 JAMA 89, 90 (2001) (“Moreover, this level of involvement and control of the
research could be viewed as the sponsor having the potential to influence the study results and
might create doubts about the validity of the research. These concerns are not without
foundation; previous reports have documented several major problems in some industry sponsored studies, including issues related to trial design, data availability, and control over
publication.” (internal citations omitted)).
33
See Lisa A. Bero, Tobacco Industry Manipulation of Research, 120 Pub. Health Rep.
200, 200-01 (describing strategies utilized by the tobacco industry to manipulate the research
on the harmful effects of smoking).
34
See id. at 202-03 (“The tobacco industry uses several vehicles to publish the findings of
its sponsored research, including symposium proceedings, books, journal articles, and letters
to the editor in medical journals”); Smith, supra note 9, at 293.
35
Bero, supra note 33, at 202-03.
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the tobacco industry and its affiliates. 36 To give credibility to its own research,
the tobacco industry then cited its own publications in non-peer reviewed
publications and in policy arenas. 37 The tobacco industry also wrote review
articles, citing their own work. 38 Policymakers often rely on review articles
because they are supposed to provide a summary of the most up-to-date
data. 39 Another tactic utilized included suppressing or criticizing research that
did not support the tobacco industry’s position. 40 The tobacco industry used
numerous tactics to mislead policymakers and the public for decades. It took
decades of research and education to overcome the strength of the tobacco
industry’s lobbying efforts to finally inform the public and policymakers o f the
harmful effects of second-hand smoke.
B. Regulating Misleading Publications
Industry publications that fail to report negative results may or may not
be subject to the Lanham Act, 41 which applies to false advertising claims. 42
While each state may have its own version of statutes designed to prohibit
false advertising, this article will focus on the federal statute. 15 U.S.C. §
1125(a)(1)(B) provides that anyone who:
in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the
nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or
her or another person’s goods, services, or commercial activities,
shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes that he
or she is or is likely to be damaged by such act. 43
Arguably, any patient or member of the public who thinks they might be
damaged by misleading industry publications that fail to fully disclose
information about a particular drug or treatment may decide to bring a claim
against the company publishing such article.
To establish a claim under this provision of the Lanham Act, a plaintiff
must prove five elements:

36
Smith, supra note 9, at 293 (“Three-quarters of the articles concluding that passive
smoking was not harmful were written by tobacco industry affiliates.”).
37
Bero, supra note 33, at 202.
38
Id. at 203.
39
Id.
40
Id. at 204.
41
The reason that the industry publications may not be subject to the Lanham Act is if the
publications in journals are not considered “commercial advertising or promotion.” Lanham
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(B) (2006).
42
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a).
43
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(B).
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(1) A false statement of fact by the defendant in a commercial
advertisement about its own or another’s product; (2) the
statement actually deceived or has the tendency to deceive a
substantial segment of its audience; (3) the deception is material,
in that it is likely to influence the purchasing decision; (4) the
defendant caused its false statement to enter interstate
commerce; and (5) the plaintiff has been or is likely to be injured
as a result of the false statement, either by direct diversion of
sales from itself to defendant or by a loss of goodwill associated
with its products.44
Applying the facts from our working hypothetical concerning the cholesterol
study, a plaintiff may establish the elements in the following way: (1) A false
statement in a publication by the pharmaceutical company that the new drug
is better than standard treatment by only showing the first six months of data;
(2) the statement has a tendency to deceive a physician in prescribing the drug
to a patient or to deceive a patient by leading the patient to request the new
drug to treat high cholesterol; (3) the false statement is likely to influence the
decision to prescribe the new drug; (4) the defendant placed its study in
interstate commerce by publishing its data; and (5) the plaintiff is likely to be
injured because the plaintiff may have wasted time or money on a treatment
that does not provide better results over the long term compared to the
standard treatment and may even have different or worse side-effects.45 Thus,
a plaintiff may be able to bring a cause of action for false advertising.
A central problem with a claim under the Lanham Act is that a
publication in a medical or scientific journal may not meet the definition of
“commercial advertising or promotion”—a required element under the
Lanham Act. 46 “Advertisement” is defined as “a public notice; especially: one
published in the press or broadcast over the air.” 47 Even though the
pharmaceutical company may have an economic interest in promoting a drug
through scientific publications, this may be different than the direct-toconsumer advertising that is usually governed under the Lanham Act. In
addition, even if the Lanham Act may be available, the Lanham Act is not
specific to concerns related to health and safety.
In specific circumstances, other federal statutes may be available that are
specific to public health and safety. For example, the Food and Drug
Administration Amendments Act (FDAAA) of 2007 reauthorized the
Pediatric Research Equity Act and the Best Pharmaceuticals for Children Act
44

United Indus. Corp. v. Clorox Co., 140 F.3d 1175, 1180 (8th Cir. 1998).
This is a simplified explanation of establishing a claim. These types of claims are
broken down further into commercial claims that are literally false and claims t hat may be
literally true, but convey a false impression. Id. Depending on the type of misleading industry
publication, claims may fall under one category or the other. See William H. Manning &
Jennifer L. McKenna, Lanham Act Also Applies to False Advertising Claims, Nat’l L.J., May
13,
2002,
at
C23,
available
at
http://www.rkmc.com/Lanham_Act_Also_Applies_to_False_Advertising_Claims.htm.
Implicitly misleading claims are probably harder to prove.
46
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(B).
47
Advertisement Definition, Merriam-Webster (italics omitted), http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/advertisement (last visited Apr. 10, 2011); see also Global Telesystems,
Inc. v. KPNQwest, N.V., 151 F. Supp. 2d 478, 483 (S.D.N.Y 2001) (citing a dictionary
definition to define advertisement).
45
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in part to regulate the use of approved medications in pediatric populations. 48
In previous work, I described the serious medical consequences of
pharmaceutical companies failing to disclose information regarding adverse
effects in pediatric populations or failing to conduct clinical studies of drugs
used in pediatric populations.49 In addition, the FDAAA now requires that
clinical trials regarding life-threatening diseases be registered in a national
registry.50 The 2007 additions and safeguards in the FDAAA are limited in
that they only address the public disclosure of certain categories of clinical
trials. Some misleading industry publications, however, may not be in these
categories.
An obvious defense from the industry to any claim described above will be
that industry publications are protected by the First Amendment, similar to
the protections granted to scientific publications in general. 51 Yet, although it
is true that the law does protect scientific publications under the First
Amendment due to the recognition that some scientific theories will be
proposed and ultimately prove incorrect, it is also recognized and accepted
that this type of collaboration and dissemination is required for scientific
advancement. Importantly, much of the scientific literature is peer-reviewed,
thus the scientific community self-patrols for reasonable theories.
The difference between the First Amendment protection of scientific
publications in general and the industry publications at issue in this article is
that the industry publications are intentionally misleading in order for the
company to make money. As discussed in Part IV below, these publications
may not be afforded full First Amendment protection; rather, they may be
subject to the same speech regulations as commercial speech.
III. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS TO PROTECT SCIENTIFIC INTEGRITY
At present, no regulations exist that fully combat the problem of the
dissemination of misleading or biased industry publications. The government
has a substantial interest in protecting the health and welfare of its citizens. In
addition, scientific integrity is called into question if the failure to report
negative results from clinical trials is used to move science in the wrong
direction. The public will begin to mistrust scientists, but it will not fully
understand what is at the root of the problem—that is, the economic interests
of pharmaceutical companies, whose economic interests may supersede health
and safety. 52 Described below are policy regulations aimed at addressing
misleading or biased publications.

48
FDAAA §§ 401-02, 501-02, 121 Stat. 823, 866, 876 (reauthorization of the Pediatric
Research Equity Act and the Best Pharmaceuticals for Children Act).
49
Sax, supra note 26, at 71-75.
50
Expanded Clinical Trial Registry Data Bank, Pub. L. No. 110-85, § 801(a)(2)(C), 121
Stat. 907 (2007).
51
See, e.g., United States v. Caronia, 576 F. Supp. 2d 385, 395 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (Scientific
and academic speech are “at the core of the First Amendment and, therefore, should receive
the highest constitutional protection as pure speech.”).
52
See, e.g., Hopkins v. Dow Corning Corp., 33 F.3d 1116 (9th Cir. 1994).
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A. Trial Registration
Trial registry, which has been called for by others, appears to be an
effective mechanism to ensure that information is publicly available. 53 Every
clinical trial would be maintained on a clinical trial registry. Any publication
that includes a clinical trial would have to cite to its registered identification
number. This resolves the problems that stem from our working hypothetical.
With a trial registry, even if a company decides to publish only the first six
months of the study, the company would have to include a reference to its trial
registry number. 54 Once the scientist views the registry, the scientist will be
able to see that the company conducted a one-year trial, but only published
results from the first six months. Armed with knowledge that the company
was trying to hide, the scientist can then critically evaluate the impact of the
results. That is, the scientist will be skeptical of the results because the
scientist now knows that the company is not reporting the full trial. The same
applies to clinicians and policymakers. In essence, it would inhibit and
prohibit companies from only making positive results available. The study
design would always be available.
Congress attempted to promote the registry of clinical trials. In 2005 and
again in 2007, Senator Chris Dodd introduced the Fair Access to Clinical Trial
(FACT) Act.55 The FACT Act proposed and expanded a user-friendly database
for clinical trials. 56 Nevertheless, the FACT Act was unclear as to whether it
required that all clinical trials be registered or instead was limited to the
mandatory registration of trials that were aimed at treating life-threatening
conditions.57
In any event, the FACT Act did not become law. 58 It is unclear whether
the FACT Act would have resolved many of the issues of underreporting or
reporting bias in pharmaceutical clinical trials, which is a major problem as
evidenced by the scandal regarding the use of anti-depressant medications in
children. 59 For example, during congressional committee hearings regarding
53
See, e.g., Kay Dickerson & Drummond Rennie, Registering Clinical Trials, 290 JAMA
516, 518 (2003); Ida Sim & Don E. Detmer, Beyond Trial Registration: A Global Trial Bank
for Clinical Trial Reporting, 2 PLoS Med. 1090, 1090-92 (2005). Of note, required trial
registry is not mandated for non-serious or non-life-threatening diseases. See Food and Drug
Administration Modernization Act of 1997 § 113, 42 U.S.C. 282(i) (2006).
54
Select peer reviewed medical journals require that a clinical trial be registered in order
to publish in that journal. See Erin D. Williams, Cong. Research Serv., RL 32832,
Clinical Trials Reporting and Publication 4 (2005). This does not, however, address the
problem of industry publications in non-peer-reviewed publications.
55
Id. at 5 (discussing S. 470, the Fair Access to Clinic Trials Act of 2005). The 2007
version was called the Fair Access to Clinical Trials Act of 2007, S. 467, 110th Cong. (2007)
[hereinafter FACT Act 2007].
56
Williams, supra note 54, at 5; FACT Act 2007, §§ 2(1)-(4).
57
Williams, supra note 54, at 5; FACT Act 2007, § 3(a)(4) (“The registry shall include
information for all clinical trials conducted to test the safety or effectiveness (including
comparative effectiveness) of any drug, biological product, or device (including those drugs,
biological products or devices approved or cleared by the Secretary) intended to treat serious or
life-threatening diseases and conditions . . . .”) (emphasis added). But see FACT Act 2007 §
3(a)(4) (“The database shall include information for all clinical trials conducted to test the
safety or effectiveness (including comparative effectiveness) of any drug , biologic product, or
device . . . .”)
58
See
S.
467:
FACT
Act,
Govtrack.us,
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=s110-467 (last visited Apr. 14, 2011).
59
See Sax, supra note 26, at 76-78.
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antidepressant clinical studies in pediatric populations, members of Congress
learned that the FDA knew of studies that demonstrated that certain
antidepressant drugs were ineffective in pediatric populations; however, only
a small number of these studies were published. 60 A comprehensive plan that
includes the registration of all clinical trials and publication requirements is
needed to resolve multiple issues with the reporting by the pharmaceutical
industry.
Even if Congress passes a requirement for a national registry, registry
alone will not resolve all gamesmanship. Rather, the FDA can step in to
expand programs that it already has to regulate misleading publications.
B. New Proposal: An Expanded Truth in Marketing Act
1. Existing Regulation
The FDA has begun to crack down on false and misleading direct-toconsumer advertising. The FDA is, in part, using the FDAAA, which amended
the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) to include provisions
regulating direct-to-consumer advertisements. 61 The FDAAA grants the FDA
the authority to preview any television advertisements for a drug prior to
dissemination of the commercial to the public. 62 If a party disseminates or
causes to be disseminated a direct-to-consumer advertisement that is false or
misleading, the FDAAA permits the FDA to impose a civil penalty. 63 These
FDAAA provisions are limited to addressing direct-to-consumer advertising.
It is not clear that this could or would include scientific publications in the
scientific or medical literature because scientific publications may not fall
under direct-to-consumer advertising. In any event, that the FDA has
authority to regulate false or misleading direct-to-consumer advertising
demonstrates that the FDA could, with appropriate legislation, also regulate
false or misleading scientific publications by some members of industry.64
In addition to the statutory language of the FDAAA, the FDA has a
program, the Bad Ad Program, which facilitates the reporting of violations in :
(1) sales representatives’ presentations; (2) speaker program presentations;
(3) TV and radio advertisements; and (4) all written or printed prescription
drug promotional materials. 65 Types of violations include: (1) omitting or
downplaying risk; (2) overstating the effectiveness; (3) promoting off-label, or

60

Id. at 74-75 (citing and discussing the hearings on antidepressant pediatric trials).
FDAAA §§ 901-03, 121 Stat. 823, 939-43.
62
Id. § 902(a), 121 Stat. 939 (“The secretary may require the submission of any television
advertisement for a drug (including any script, story board, rough, or a completed video
production of the television advertisement) to the Secretary for review under this section not
later than 45 days before dissemination of the television advertisement.”)
63
Id. § 902(g), 121 Stat. 940.
64
As described in Part III below, the FDA should be able to regulate the content of the
industry publications so long as the publications are deemed comme rcial speech and any
regulation does not violate the test articulated in Central Hudson. See Cent. Hudson Gas &
Electric Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
65
FDA, Truthful Prescription Drug Advertising and Promotion (Bad Ad Program),
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/Surveillance/DrugM
arketingAdvertisingandCommunications/ucm209384.htm (last updated Mar. 31, 2011).
61
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unapproved, uses; and (4) misleading drug comparisons. 66 The Bad Ad
Program is a step in the right direction, although it is limited in that it relies
on the reporting by others of potential violations. Also, it is limited because it
focuses on presentations, advertisements and promotional materials. It does
not explicitly include scientific publications, which are not necessarily clearly
promotional. Furthermore, it is an outreach program administered by the
FDA. As described in the Bad Ad Program, the FDA may be able to bring an
enforcement action against a potential violator, but it is not a regulation that
contains a private cause of action. 67 That is, the Bad Ad Program may not be
strong enough medicine to crack down on the wide variety of misleading
tactics employed by the pharmaceutical companies.
The FDAAA prohibitions and the Bad Ad Program demonstrate that the
FDA is concerned about the promotion and dissemination of misleading
information by pharmaceutical companies. But, direct-to-consumer
advertising is not the only way that pharmaceutical companies exert influence.
Publications in scientific and medical journals, which this article refers to as
indirect-to-consumer advertisements, can impact scientific progress and
policies and have direct consequences for the public. In addition, the FDAAA
regulations do not address a private cause of action, which may be a way to
further clamp down on misleading publications.
2. A Proposed Expansion
This article proposes the introduction of a regulation to address the
problem of misleading industry publications—the Truth in Marketing (TIM)
Act. This new regulation should promote transparency and address the
following areas:
(1) if the pharmaceutical company decides to end a clinical trial
early, then any publication of the early parts of the clinical trial
must include a notice that the clinical trial ended early;
(2) if the pharmaceutical company obtains any data from any
portion of a clinical trial suggesting that the drug may cause
harm at any time or if the data indicate that follow-up studies are
necessary, this information must be included in any publication;
(3) if the pharmaceutical company obtains any data from any
portion of a clinical trial suggesting that the drug is safe and
effective, but does not offer therapeutic advantages over standard
treatment, this information must be included in any publication;
(4) if a pharmaceutical company obtains any data that is contrary
to or inconsistent with the reported conclusion(s) in a publication
that a reasonable person in the scientific community would draw,
that data must be included in any publication; and

66
67

Id.
Id.
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(5) a private cause of action can be brought for the violation of
the provisions of this regulation if the FDA fails to diligently
prosecute the violation in question. 68
Violators of TIM should face steep monetary penalties. If the monetary
penalties do not deter—that is, the same pharmaceutical company is a repeat
offender—the FDA should be competent to issue an injunction that prohibits
the pharmaceutical company from conducting any clinical trials or submitting
applications for new drugs or devices for a specified period of time.
To determine the penalties for violation of TIM, the FDA should utilize
economics to maximize deterrence. In brief, if one applies a traditional
rational actor model, the formula that the pharmaceutical company will use
when contemplating publishing biased or misleading information is whether
the value of noncompliance is greater or less than the economic savings
associated with noncompliance, minus the likelihood the violation will be
detected, times the expected fine if the noncompliance is detected. 69 If the
pharmaceutical company is a rational actor, then it will comply with the
regulation when the expected value of noncompliance is negative. If the
expected value of noncompliance is positive, then the rational pharmaceutical
company will ignore the regulation and violate the law because the incentives
create a regime where it is cheaper for them to ignore the law. 70 To
successfully deter misleading industry publications, the FDA will need to
research and assign values to the variables in order to establish the
appropriate monetary penalties.
The proposal of a new FDA regulation that companies must comply with
will face opposition. Often, FDA regulations suffer from many of the same
complaints as those that surround Environmental Protection Agency
restrictions; that is, the rules are complex and difficult to understand, making
compliance difficult. 71 It is likely that any attempt by the FDA to restrict the
publication of misleading information will face similar challenges. This does
not mean, however, that the ability of pharmaceutical companies to publish
partial truths that have the adverse consequence of misleading the medical
community, politicians, and the public should be unchecked.
IV. THE COMMERCIAL SPEECH DOCTRINE APPLIED TO MISLEADING
INDUSTRY PUBLICATIONS
The above proposals, trial registry and the TIM Act, arguably place
constraints on industry’s speech. Industry publications, as described above,
may be subject to the commercial speech doctrine. Although described in
detail in the legal scholarship, a brief synopsis of the commercial speech

68
Cf. David Spence, The Shadow of the Rational Polluter: Rethinking the Role of the
Rational Actor Model in Environmental Law, 89 Cal. L. Rev. 917, 940 (2001) (“Most
environmental statutes bar citizens from proceeding if the government is diligently
prosecuting the violations in question.”).
69
Id. at 920 (demonstrating this formula for prospective violators of environmental laws).
The underlying rationale of environmental law can be applied to the FDA because the
Environmental Protection Agency and FDA are both large regulatory regimes.
70
Id. at 921.
71
Id. at 931.
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doctrine as applicable to the issues raised in this article is appropriate here. 72
After this brief summary, this article discusses how the commercial speech
doctrine may be applied to misleading industry publications. Finally, this part
discusses how any regulations must satisfy the commercial speech doctrine
framework in order to withstand judicial scrutiny.
A. Commercial Speech Doctrine: A Brief Overview
In the landmark case Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council, the Supreme Court articulated that commercial
speech is protected by the First Amendment, but that the speech remains
subject to permissible regulations. 73 The Court provided that “[u]ntruthful
speech, commercial or otherwise, has never been protected for its own sake.” 74
In Virginia State Board, the Court acknowledged that a state may regulate
commercial speech that is provably false, deceptive, or misleading.75
In Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of
New York, the Court again acknowledged that commercial speech may be
afforded a lesser protection than other forms of “constitutionally guaranteed
expression.”76 In recognition of this, the Court stated that “[t]he government
may ban forms of communication more likely to deceive the public than to
inform it.”77 However, any restriction of expression must be carefully
designed.78
Because it determines the rigor of review, a characterization must be
made as to whether the speech in question is commercial or non-commercial.
Regulations aimed at non-commercial, fully-protected speech receive strict
scrutiny, whereas laws addressing commercial speech may regulate it based
on content.79 In short, the characterization of the speech determines whether
the speech is fully protected under the First Amendment, or whether the
government has more leeway in regulating the speech. To make a
determination as to whether the speech is commercial, a court looks to: (1)
whether the speech is an advertisement; (2) whether the speech refers to a
specific product; and (3) whether the speaker has an economic motivation. 80
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See, e.g., C. Edwin Baker, Paternalism, Politics, and Citizen Freedom: The Commercial
Speech Quandary in Nike, 54 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1161 (2003-04); Glenn C. Smith, Avoiding
Awkward Alchemy–In the Off-Label Drug Context and Beyond: Fully Protected Independent
Research Should Not Transmogrify into Mere Commercial Speech Just Because Product
Manufacturers Distribute It, 34 Wake Forest L. Rev. 963, 988-1016 (1999).
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Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 770
(1976).
74
Id. at 771.
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See id.
76
Cent. Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 563
(1980).
77
Id.
78
Id. at 567.
79
See, e.g., United States v. Caronia, 576 F. Supp. 2d 385, 395 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (describing
that speech protected by the First Amendment receives the highest constitutional protection).
80
Id. at 396; see also Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prod. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 67 & n.14 (1983)
(describing that the “combination of all these characteristics” provides strong support to
characterize speech as commercial, but that the characteristics of all three do not have to be
present in order for the speech to be commercial).
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Once speech is deemed to be commercial, the Court articulated a fourpart analysis to determine when the government may restrict it. 81 First, the
speech “must concern lawful activity and not be misleading.” 82 Second, the
Court must ask whether the asserted government interest in regulating the
speech is substantial. 83 Third, it must be determined that the regulation
advances the asserted government interest. 84 Finally, the Court will determine
whether the government regulation is more extensive than necessary to serve
the state interest. 85
Of note, if the commercial speech concerns unlawful activity or is
misleading, the speech is not protected. 86 To determine whether speech is
misleading, it must be more likely to deceive the public than to inform it. 87 If
the commercial speech is misleading, the analysis ends there. If, however, the
commercial speech concerns lawful activity and is not clearly misleading, then
a court will continue to steps two through four of the Central Hudson test.88
B. The Commercial Speech Doctrine Applied to Misleading or Biased
Industry Publications
An application of the facts from our working hypothetical to the
commercial speech jurisprudence demonstrates that some industry
publications may be subject to the commercial speech doctrine. Here, the
industry publication hypothetical that advances the use of its drug over the
standard treatment appears to satisfy the requirements of commercial speech.
First, an industry publication is a promotion of a new drug. It is unclear
whether an industry publication is an advertisement in a classical sense. As
mentioned above, advertisement is defined as “a public notice; especially: one
published in the press or broadcast over the air.” 89 In the general sense, one
usually thinks of advertisements as TV commercials, billboards, or ads in a
magazine. This article refers to these types of advertising as direct-toconsumer advertising. Industry publications in the medical or scientific
literature that promote products to scientists and physicians do not appear to
fall under the classical definition of advertisement because they are not ads in
a magazine or quick clips on the television. However, the publication
nonetheless communicates information to the scientific and medical
community and public for the advancement of the use of a particular therapy
and so it has some of the characteristics of the term advertisement. Put
differently, the promotion of the drugs to doctors, who ultimately prescribe
81
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United States v. Caronia, 576 F. Supp. 2d 385, 396-97 (E.D.N.Y. 2008).
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Id. at 397 (quoting Wash. Legal Found. v. Friedman, 13 F. Supp. 2d 51, 74-75 (D.D.C.
1998)).
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speech doctrine. See generally Smith, supra note 72, at 988-1016.
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Advertisement, supra note 47; see also Global Telesystems, Inc. v. KPNQwest, N.V., 151
F. Supp. 2d 478, 483 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (citing a dictionary definition to define advertisement).
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the medication to patients, is what makes this speech a promotion of a
particular product. 90 This article utilizes the term, indirect-to-consumer
advertising, to describe the promotion of an industry’s product in the
scientific or medical literature to the medical community for use in the
general public or to entice academic scientists to use federal funding dollars to
conduct research. Second, the publication refers to the specific drug
manufactured by the company, and, finally, the company has an economic
motivation to promote the use of its drug.91
A potential counterargument to the above analysis that deems industry
publications commercial speech is that “academic and scientific” speech are
afforded full First Amendment protection, and that industry publications fall
within “academic and scientific” speech.92 This is a weak counterargument,
however, if the industry publication is placed in a non-peer reviewed journal,
the publication deliberately omits important scientific information and the
purpose of the publication is to reach the medical community in order to
promote the sale of the product. 93 The reason that scientific and academic
speech is fully protected is to let ideas flow freely within a community to allow
science to progress and allow for paradigm shifts. Industry publications,
which are not peer reviewed or intentionally leave out important information
that would change the conclusions, do not promote the free flow of ideas or
allow for paradigm shifts. Here, the industry publication is specifically
describing the advantages of its particular product in an effort to increase
sales and revenues related to its product. Applying facts from our working
hypothetical, it is clear that the purposes of the publications are to promote
the use and sales specifically of the company’s new product, which is why it
may be characterized as commercial speech. 94 This may mislead the scientific
community, the public at large, and policymakers.
If the publications in our working hypothetical are deemed commercial
speech, an analysis must next determine whether the government may restrict
the speech. 95 The first prong of the Central Hudson test is to determine
whether the speech concerns lawful activity and is not misleading. 96
Misleading is defined as “likely to mislead a reasonable consumer acting
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reasonably under the circumstances.”97 Here, an industry publication that
intentionally omits data that demonstrates that the new drug does not offer
better therapeutic treatment after one year when compared to the standard
treatment is misleading to the reader. 98 For example, a prescribing physician
who reads that the new drug offers greater therapeutic advantage than the
standard treatment may recommend that their patients use the new drug over
standard treatment. This will increase the sales for the pharmaceutical
company, but the new treatment does not offer the patient advantages over
the long-term. It is reasonable to assume that a physician would want to use
what he considers to be the best drug in the treatment of the patients, and an
industry publication that omits the long-term data may influence the
physician to prescribe the new drug.
Furthermore, if an additional fact is added to our working hypothetical,
such as that the pharmaceutical company provides pens and pads of paper to
physicians with the company logo, this might create an additional influence
on the prescribing physician to prescribe the new drug. Studies have shown
that even small gifts can have the impact of unduly influencing the decisions
that physicians make in prescribing medications. 99 The point is that over the
years, the pharmaceutical industry has utilized tactics that promote their
products and increase the sale of their drugs. Many of these tactics impact the
way physicians prescribe drugs, even on an unconscious level.
In sum, by publishing only the results from the first six months of the
trial, which demonstrates that the new drug is superior to the standard
treatment, the company is misleading scientists, clinicians, and the public to
believe that the new drug offers greater therapeutic advantages to treat a longterm cholesterol problem than the standard treatment. This publication is
misleading. Once there is a determination that the speech is misleading, the
analysis ends there.
One problem with characterizing the speech in our working hypothetical
as misleading is that a court may require an affirmative statement in order for
the speech to be considered misleading. The misleading nature of the speech
in the working hypothetical is misleading because there is an omission of data.
In other words, the inclusion of the long-term data would lead a reasonable
scientific person to conclude that the new drug does not offer any therapeutic
advantage over standard therapy, while by the omission of that data, the
reasonable scientific person is misled to believe that the industry’s
conclusion(s) are taken from the six-month data, which indicate that the new
treatment may offer better results than the standard therapy. For this reason,
an analysis of the other three elements of the Central Hudson test is critical.
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Cohen v. JP Morgan Chase & Co., 498 F.3d 111, 126 (2d Cir. 2007) (citing Oswego
Laborers’ Local 214 Pension Fund v. Marine Midland Bank, 647 N.E.2d 741, 745 (N.Y. 1995)).
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See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
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Ass’n of Am. Med. Colls., Industry Funding of Medical Education: Report of
an AAMC Task Force 4 (2008), www.aamc.org/publications (search publications: Industry
Funding) (“Supplementing the robust psychosocial evidence regarding the effect of gifts on
physician decision making, recent neurobiological studies document th at inherent biological
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The second prong of the Central Hudson test analyzes whether the
government has a substantial interest in regulating the speech. 100 Here, the
FDA has a substantial interest in regulating the use of prescription drugs in
order to protect the public.101 All clinical trial protocols to study an
unapproved drug or an approved product for a new indication must be
approved by the FDA, via the Investigational New Drug Application. 102 In
order to obtain FDA drug approval, the results of clinical trials must be
reported to the FDA. 103 The FDA’s scheme that regulates clinical trials with
the purpose of having public health and safety at the forefront may be
thwarted by publications that fail to fully report clinical trials. That is, even
though the pharmaceutical company must report results from clinical trials to
the FDA so that the FDA can assess the results and make decisions that
consider the public’s health and safety, by reporting only a portion of the
results from the clinical trials to the medical community directly, this can chip
away at the FDA’s purpose of protecting the public. The government has a
substantial interest in requiring full disclosure of clinical trial data to the
scientific and medical communities and the public such that unbiased and
non-misleading information reaches the public to ensure public health and
safety.
The National Institutes of Health (NIH) also has a substantial interest in
the funding of scientific research. 104 If a scientist submits a grant application
that includes proposals for research that rely on industry publications that
conceal data, the scientist may be on a wild-goose chase, with the government
funding the effort. This has the negative effects of wasting valuable scientific
resources as well as costs to the taxpayers who fund academic research. In
sum, the government has a substantial interest in protecting the health and
welfare of its citizens.
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The third element in the Central Hudson test is that the regulation
advances the asserted government interest. 105 Here, it is not clear that any
federal regulation that is in effect at this time requires a publication to include
all of the results of all clinical trials. The Food and Drug Administration
Modernization Act of 1997 only requires the public registration of clinical
trials that address life-threatening conditions.106 Again, for drug approval the
FDA requires that a company apply to conduct a clinical trial and report the
results to the FDA; but nothing in the regulations require that the company
publicly report the results.107 This lack of regulation, in part, may allow a
loophole for industry to underreport negative results of clinical trials in
publications. As described in Part III, the TIM Act would close the current
loophole. In sum, the TIM Act directly advances the government interest of
protecting the health and safety of the public because it would require the
disclosure in scientific and medical literature of data that may lead a
reasonable scientific reviewer to conclude differently from the stated
conclusions in the publication.
Finally, a determination is made as to whether the government regulation
is more extensive than necessary to serve the state interest. 108 Again, at this
time, no regulation addresses the requirement of dissemination of negative
results of all clinical trials. But if the policy objectives of the TIM Act are
turned into a regulation, this regulation must comply with the requirements
of the Central Hudson test.
In sum, no current regulation adequately regulates misleading or biased
industry publications in scientific and medical literature. The government has
a substantial interest in protecting the public health and should enact
regulations to address misleading or biased publications. Mandatory trial
registry and the TIM Act are strong starting points to address misleading and
biased industry publications, but any new policy must be wary of a claim that
the regulation violates First Amendment rights. This symposium is an
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(2006); see Guidance for Industry, Information Program on Clinical Trials for Serio us or LifeThreatening
Diseases
and
Condition
(Mar.
2002),
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/RegulatoryInformation/Guidances/UCM126838.pdf (“Section
113 of the Modernization Act creates a public resource for information on studies of drugs,
including biological drug products, to treat serious or life-threatening diseases and conditions
conducted under FDA’s investigational new drug (IND) regulations (21 CFR part 312).”).
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important place to continue the dialogue of the increasing role of the
commercial speech doctrine in health regulation.
V. CONCLUSION
Misleading or biased publications reporting results of clinical trials
cannot go unchecked due to the potential for harmful effects on scientific
integrity and public health. The commercial speech doctrine allows the
government to regulate some speech if there is a defined purpose. Thus, the
growing role of the commercial speech doctrine in health regulation—the
important topic of this symposium—is the launching point for the government
to regulate misleading or biased indirect-to-consumer publications.
The current policies of the FDA are a good starting point, but these
regulations do not necessarily reach misleading industry publications that are
not clearly advertising. This article proposes the expansion of current FDA
policies to cast a wider net to include indirect-to-consumer marketing.
Policymakers can learn from publicized stories over the past few decades—
such as the tobacco industry tactics and breast implant cases—to draft
regulations to ensure that the scientific and medical communities,
policymakers, and the public have accurate information in order to make the
best healthcare decisions. In this way, scientific integrity—which benefits the
public—can be protected and continue to provide improved healthcare
services to the public.

